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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a decision making strategy for 
autonomous multi-platform systems, wherein a number of 
platforms perform phased missions in order to achieve an 
overall mission objective. Phased missions are defined for 
both single and multi-platform systems and a decision making 
strategy is outlined for such systems. The requirements for a 
tool performing such a strategy are discussed and methods and 
techniques, traditionally used for system reliability 
assessment, are identified to fulfill these requirements. Two 
examples are presented in order to demonstrate how a decision 
making tool would be employed in practice. Finally, a brief 
discussion of the efficient implementation of such a strategy is 
presented. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Many systems perform missions that consist of several 
distinct phases carried out in sequence. In order for the 
mission to be successful, each of the phases must be 
completed successfully. The requirements for the successful 
completion of each phase are different as, therefore, are the 
causes of failure in each phase. An example of such a phased 
mission is an aircraft flight. The simple flight can be 
considered as involving phases: taxi to the runway, take off, 
climb to a cruising altitude, cruise, descend, land and taxi back 
to the terminal. Other examples of phased missions include 
military operations of aircraft or ships and spacecraft missions. 
The consequences of failure of such missions are often high 
and, as such, accurate methods of analysis are required to 
examine failure probabilities in each phase of the mission and 
of the mission as a whole. Methods used to model the failure 
probability of such phased missions are fault tree analysis [1], 
cause-consequence analysis [2] and binary decision diagrams 
[3]. 
Autonomous systems can operate in environments which 
would be of high risk for human operators. Unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), other unmanned vehicles (UXV), such as 
land vehicles, or other autonomous robots are examples of 
such systems. In such autonomous platforms there is a 
requirement placed on the system to make decisions, without 
human input, at various stages within the mission as to the 
next suitable course of action. These decisions must be made 
in an informed manner, taking into account the risk associated 
with any actions to the platform itself and also the risk to 
human life or any objects within the platform’s locality. 
Increasingly, within many environments, there will be 
requirements placed upon autonomous platforms to work 
collaboratively in order to achieve an overall mission goal. An 
obvious example of this is the progression of some military 
operations towards network-enabled capability (NEC) or 
network-centric warfare (NCW). Individual platforms within 
such multi-platform phased missions must make decisions not 
only accounting for their own particular phased mission but 
also accounting for the overall mission being carried out by 
the group of platforms. 
In the cases of both single and multi-platform phased 
missions, the decision making process used by the 
autonomous platforms is of the utmost importance. A key 
factor in making decisions about whether or how to implement 
future mission phases for individual platforms will be the 
likelihood of failure of the platform, or of other platforms, 
within future mission phases. Components can fail and 
external conditions can change once the mission gets 
underway. There are two distinct times when a mission 
prognosis can be provided and used to make an informed 
decision on the future of the mission. Before a mission is due 
to start a prognosis can be used to determine whether or not 
the mission should begin in its current configuration. Once the 
mission is underway a prognosis can be made as the 
conditions change. This would take into account that certain 
parts of the mission have been completed and also if failures 
have occurred on platforms, systems, subsystems or 
components. If the prognosis of mission success falls below 
pre-determined, acceptable levels then the mission could be 
aborted or a reconfiguration could take place. Such a 
reconfiguration might involve different platforms within the 
multi-platform phased mission performing tasks in a different 
order or performing an altogether new set of tasks. It might 
even be decided that a whole new mission objective should be 
considered. Clearly, in a rapidly changing mission 
environment there is a need for a prognostics tool to provide 
information quickly and accurately in order that well-informed 
decisions can be made in the shortest possible timeframe. 
In this paper an overall strategy of using a prognostics 
capability within a decision making framework is introduced. 
A method of using established techniques of phased mission 
reliability analysis to provide a prognostics capability is 
described for single platform phased missions and this method 
is then extended to cover multi-platform phased missions. 
2 PHASED MISSION DEFINITIONS 
Single and multi-platform phased missions have a number 
of features and characteristics. The assumptions made about 
each type of phased mission are detailed in the following 
sections.  
2.1 Single Platform Phased Mission Definition 
A representation of a single platform phased mission with 
n phases is shown in  Figure 1.  
Figure 1 – A Single Platform Phased Mission. 
In general a single platform phased mission has the 
following characteristics: 
• A mission consists of a number of consecutive, sequential 
phases. 
• Each phase has different functional requirements and 
therefore different failure criteria from other phases. 
• Mission success requires all phases to be successfully 
completed. 
For the techniques described in this paper a number of 
further assumptions are made: 
• The length of each phase is known. 
• The mission is non-repairable and therefore component 
failures remain in the system once they have occurred. 
• All components are in the working state as the mission 
begins. 
2.2 Multi-Platform Phased Mission Definition 
A multi-platform phased mission is performed by a 
number of single platforms, each of which performs a phased 
mission as outlined in section 2.1. The multi-platform phased 
mission as a whole has the following characteristics: 
• Each platform performs a task or number of tasks 
(defined here as mission tasks) that contribute to the 
overall mission objective as part of its own phased 
mission. 
• The mission tasks are not necessarily sequential – 
different mission tasks can be carried out in parallel by 
different platforms. 
• Mission tasks can have certain requirements, such as a 
need for mission tasks to be carried out in strict sequence 
or to start or end simultaneously. 
A number of assumptions are also made: 
• For the individual platforms the assumptions are outlined 
in the previous section. 
• The mission is assumed to fail if any of the individual 
platforms performing the mission fail at any point during 
the mission. Note that in this case a new mission 
configuration or objective could be implemented with the 
remaining platforms. The failure is only of the original 
mission. 
3 OVERALL DECISION MAKING STRATEGY 
Here an overall strategy for the formation of a decision 
making process for phased missions involving autonomous 
systems is presented. The strategy is based on the probability 
of mission failure. There are two times at which mission 
failure probabilities must be calculated; these are described 
below, before the overall strategy is presented. The basic 
requirements for implementing such a strategy are then 
discussed. 
3.1 Mission Failure Probabilities 
There are two different probabilities that can be required 
as a mission progresses. These are: 
• initial failure probabilities, 
• updated failure probabilities. 
The initial failure probabilities are calculated before a 
mission begins. For a single platform, these give a measure of 
that platform’s failure probability in each of its phases and 
also of the total failure probability of the platform. The 
updated failure probabilities are calculated once the mission is 
in progress at the point that system functionality or 
environmental changes occur. They provide a measure of the 
failure probability given information about the system, such as 
the phases that have been completed or the known status of 
certain parts of the system. For multi-platform missions, the 
same initial and updated failure probabilities can be calculated 
for the single platforms performing the mission and also for 
the mission as a whole. Thus, the failure probability of the 
mission can be calculated for the mission in each of its 
constituent phases and also over its entire length. 
3.2 The Strategy 
Presented in this section is a decision making strategy for 
autonomous vehicles. The strategy involves calculating the 
probability of mission failure at required points within the 
mission (e.g. after faults are known to have occurred or after 
other environmental effects occur). If the probability of 
mission failure is unacceptably high then a mission 
reconfiguration occurs. 
The algorithm for the decision making strategy is shown 
in Figure 2. There are two tools that must be used in order to 
facilitate the decision making: a prognostic tool and a 
diagnostic tool. The diagnostic tool must track the system (or 
system of systems in the case of multi-platform systems) and 
recognize a number of events, such as: 
1. Any faults that occur within the system, such as faults 
occurring on individual platforms. Faults might be 
identified at component level but most likely at functional 
or subsystem level. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase n 
2. Environmental changes that affect the platforms, such as 
the weather or the presence of an enemy force. 
3. Successful components of the mission. E.g. completed 
platform phases, mission tasks, or the known successful 
function of components, subsystems or systems up to 
certain points within the mission. 
The job of the prognostics tool is to use all available 
mission information to provide measures of the likelihood of 
mission success. A reliability based technique is presented 
here to provide this measure. The tool calculates failure 
probabilities for both individual platforms and, in the case of 
multi-platform phased missions, for the mission as a whole. 
Failure probabilities are calculated for the separate phases of 
the mission and also for the entire duration of the mission. 
 Figure 2 – The Decision Making Strategy 
In order that the failure probabilities can be used as part 
of a decision making tool the acceptable mission failure 
probability is defined for each platform and for the mission as 
a whole. If the failure probabilities predicted by the 
prognostics tool exceed any of these values then there is a 
requirement to reconfigure the mission. This could mean that 
the platforms involved in the mission perform their mission 
tasks in a different way in order that the objective be achieved. 
Alternatively, the platforms could be reconfigured to work 
towards an alternative mission objective or the mission could 
be aborted altogether and the platforms return to base. 
Thus, for a typical mission, a prognostics assessment 
would be carried out before the mission began. This would 
involve the calculation of the initial failure probabilities of the 
original mission configuration. If these failure probabilities 
were acceptably low then the mission would begin. Once the 
mission is under way a diagnostics tool would gather 
information about any changes to system variables. As new 
information is obtained, the prognostics tool would calculate 
updated failure probabilities which would again be checked 
against the acceptable values. If, at any time, the probability of 
failure reaches unacceptable levels then a mission 
reconfiguration would take place. This could be a 
reconfiguration of platforms or a reconfiguration of the tasks 
that they perform. 
3.3 Requirements 
Clearly, in most missions, the prediction time will be of 
critical importance. Having the ability to respond quickly to a 
changing environment or situation could, for example, give an 
edge to a force in a combat situation. It follows that, should 
autonomous systems be deployed, decisions should be well-
informed and accurately made in the shortest possible time. 
This leads to two main requirements for the reliability-based 
prognostics tool. The failure probabilities calculated within it 
must be: 
• Accurate. 
• Quickly obtained. 
If one considers the reliability tools available, Monte 
Carlo simulation [4] can be discounted due to the time taken to 
perform a sufficient number of simulations to obtain 
convergent results. Markov techniques [5] can also be 
discounted due to the complexity of the systems in question 
and the resultant state space explosion. Fault trees provide an 
excellent way of representing the failure logic associated with 
the platforms and their phases. However, when it comes to 
analysis, the kinetic tree theory [5] [6] will be unlikely to 
deliver the results required in the time available. 
Approximations would also need to be used, the accuracy of 
these approximations, particularly when NOT logic is 
incorporated in the system fault trees (i.e. the fault trees are 
non-coherent), may not be good enough. However, fault trees 
can be converted to binary decision diagrams (BDD), [7]. 
BDDs represent the failure logic of a system and can be 
analyzed to give exact values of system failure probability. 
The analysis is also very fast. Indeed, due to these properties, 
BDDs would appear to offer the greatest opportunity for 
performing the real-time analysis of the system failure 
probability that is required in the decision making tool. 
Previous work has shown that it is possible to perform the 
analysis of single platform phased missions [3]. Methods of 
computing initial and updated failure probabilities are outlined 
in the next section for single platform phased missions. The 
extensions of these methods for multi-platform phased 
missions are then discussed. 
4 SINGLE-PLATFORM MISSION MODELING 
4.1 Phased Mission Unreliability Quantification 
A critical part of the decision making strategy is for the 
prognostics tool to provide an accurate prediction of the 
probability of mission failure. 
A method of calculating the mission failure probability is 
detailed in [3]. The method works by calculating the 
probability of failure, Qi, in each of the mission phases, i, and 
then adding these to give the total mission failure probability, 
QMISS. 
 The failure logic for each of the platform phases is first 
represented in fault tree form. These must then be used to 
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construct the failure logic representing mission failure in each 
of the phases. The general fault tree for this is shown in Figure 
3. As can be seen from the diagram, in order for the failure 
conditions to be met in phase i, and for the mission to fail 
during phase i, the failure conditions must not have been met 
during any of the previous phases. 
Figure 3 – Fault Tree for Mission Failure During Phase i 
The analysis of this fault tree allows the probability of 
failure during mission phase i, Qi, to be found. Thus the total 
mission failure probability is given by: 
∑
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While updating the mission failure probability once the 
mission is under way [8], the fact that the previous phases of 
the mission have been successful is taken into account. Using 
Bayes’ theorem to take into account that k phases have been 
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Then QMISS is calculated by adding the phase failure 
probabilities of the remaining mission phases: 
∑
+=
=
n
kj
kjMISS QQ
1
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Any additional information provided by the diagnostics 
system on the status of individual components, functions, 
subsystems or environmental effects must be included in the 
calculations for the updated phase failure probabilities. 
Equation (2) would again be used to incorporate this 
information. 
Since efficiency and accuracy of the analysis is especially 
important in real-time modeling, phase fault trees are 
converted to BDDs offline prior to the mission. Using this 
method an accurate probability of the future mission failure 
can be provided to the decision making system in a short 
period of time.  
4.2 Platform and Mission Description 
Consider a simplified UAV that is to perform a phased 
mission. The mission objective is to travel from location A to 
location B and successfully land at location B. There are three 
mission phases to be performed, these being take-off, cruise 
and landing. All three phases must be successfully completed 
in order for the mission to be a success. Each phase may only 
begin after the successful completion of previous phases. It is 
important that the UAV makes clear, rational decisions and 
takes the action necessary to preserve safety and achieve the 
highest level of mission success. The following section gives 
an overview of the application of the decision making 
methodology. 
4.3 Interpretation of the Methodology 
Before the UAV can start its mission the initial phase 
failure probabilities, Qi, are calculated by the prognostics tool 
using equation (1). Assume the values are as given in Table 1. 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 QMISS 
0.020 0.010 0.020 0.050 
Table 1 – Initial Phase and Mission Failure Probabilities 
If QMISS is within the accepted limits (QMISS<Qmax), the 
proposed mission can start. Otherwise, a new mission profile 
should be configured. 
The updated mission failure probability will be calculated 
by the prognostics tool when some component failures occur 
and are reported by the diagnostic tool. For example, if during 
the take-off one of the functions of the flight control system is 
lost, using equation (2) gives the updated phase failure 
probabilities shown in Table 2. 
 
Q1 1|2Q  1|3Q  QMISS 
0 0.300 0.200 0.500 
Table 2 – Updated Phase and Mission Failure Probabilities 
After each update QMISS is compared with Qmax. If QMISS 
increases too much, i.e. exceeds Qmax, a mission 
reconfiguration must take place. Alternative mission phases 
are incorporated into the mission, which result in a smaller 
mission failure probability or are perhaps necessary due to the 
circumstances observed. For example, the UAV might be 
redirected to another airfield, in order to land at the earliest 
opportunity, if the failure probability of the original mission is 
unacceptable. As the UAV continues its mission the decision 
making process will also continue. 
5 MULTI-PLATFORM MISSION MODELING 
5.1 Phased Mission Unreliability Quantification 
The most important distinction between single platform 
phased missions and multi-platform phased missions when 
modeling reliability is that mission tasks and phases of 
different platforms are not necessarily sequential. It is 
important to identify the separate phases of the mission, given 
the platform phases and the way that the platforms must 
interact. This is done by identifying all distinct individual 
Failure of 
platform during 
phase i 
Failure 
conditions met 
in phase 1 
Failure 
conditions met 
in phase i-1 
Failure conditions 
not met in 
previous phases 
Failure 
conditions met 
during phase i
platform phase start and end points. This is best explained by 
means of an example covered in section 5.2. 
Once the distinct mission phases have been identified the 
initial failure probabilities can be calculated for the single 
platforms using the techniques shown in the previous section. 
For single platforms operating within a multi-platform phased 
mission the failure probabilities are calculated in the mission 
phases rather than in the platform phases. A similar process is 
used when calculating the updated failure probabilities for the 
single platforms, with the probability of failure in the mission 
phases being calculated. The mission prognosis for the 
individual platforms would be compared against acceptable 
levels to determine the necessity of mission reconfiguration. 
Calculating the initial probability of failure of the mission 
as a whole in the separate platform phases involves 
constructing the failure logic of the mission in the relevant 
phases. Given the assumption that the failure of any platform 
causes the mission to fail the logical expression for the 
probability of mission failure during a mission phase is 
constructed as follows. Account is taken of the fact that all 
platforms must have successfully completed the previous 
mission phases and any single platform failure during that 
mission phase causes mission failure. This logical expression 
is quantified to give the initial phase failure probability for the 
mission and these values are added to give the initial failure 
probability for the mission as a whole. Note that platform 
phase failure probabilities cannot simply be added to give 
mission phase failure probabilities because of dependencies 
that are likely to exist between platforms that are working in 
collaboration. 
As with the single platforms, the updated failure 
probabilities are calculated using Bayes’ theorem to take into 
account any information about the system, provided by a 
diagnostic tool. Phase failure probabilities would be calculated 
for each of the remaining phases and these added to give the 
total mission failure probability for the remainder of the 
mission. 
5.2 Platform and Mission Description 
Consider a UAV and an autonomous land vehicle (LV) 
that are required to work together to achieve a mission 
objective, as shown in Figure 4. As the mission is due to begin 
they are at separate locations. They must meet at a third 
location, A, before traveling together to a final destination, B, 
with the UAV performing reconnaissance ahead of the land 
vehicle. 
Assume that the UAV must simply cruise to the meeting 
point and then fly a reconnaissance pattern ahead of the land 
vehicle, i.e. two distinct phases. Assume that the land vehicle 
must also perform two distinct phases, traveling to the meeting 
point and traveling to the final destination. There is a 
constraint on the platforms in that the land vehicle and the 
UAV are required to reach the meeting point simultaneously. 
Due to the distances to be traveled by the platforms and their 
speeds, the land vehicle must start its journey to A before the 
UAV. This leads to the mission representation shown in 
Figure 5, where it can be seen that, because the land vehicle 
takes longer to complete its first phase than the UAV, the 
UAV starts its first phase after the UAV. It can be seen that 
there are three distinct mission phases, which are: 
1. The land vehicle travels to A, 
2. The land vehicle travels to A AND the UAV travels to A, 
3. The land vehicle travels from A to B AND the UAV 
travels from A to B while performing reconnaissance.  
 
 Figure 4 – Plan View of Mission Locations 
Figure 5 – Representation of Platform and Mission Phases 
5.3 Interpretation of the Methodology 
Before the mission begins the prognostics tool is used to 
calculate the initial phase failure probabilities for each 
platform and for the mission as a whole. These are added to 
give the total failure probability for the UAV, the LV and the 
mission as a whole over the entire mission duration. Assume 
that these values are as shown in Table 3. 
 
Platform Q1 Q2 Q3 QMISS 
LV 0.020 0.025 0.050 0.095 
UAV - 0.019 0.012 0.031 
Mission 0.020 0.040 0.055 0.115 
Table 3 – Initial Phase and Mission Failure Probabilities 
Note that there is no failure probability associated with the 
UAV in mission phase 1, since the UAV only begins its own 
mission in mission phase 2. Let us assume that at this point the 
failure probabilities are acceptable and the mission begins. 
The LV begins its journey to point A and at some point soon 
after the UAV also starts to travel to A. They meet at A, at 
which point the UAV is due to perform reconnaissance ahead 
of the LV while it travels to point B. However, at this time, a 
fault has occurred in the communication system used by the 
two vehicles and is reported by the diagnostic tool. A new 
calculation of the mission failure probability is needed 
quickly, before mission phase 3 can begin. Updated phase 
failure probabilities are calculated and are as given in Table 4. 
Now the failure probabilities of each platform, and of the 
mission as a whole, have risen. In the case of the mission the 
1 2 3 
1 2 
2 1
Mission
LV
UAV
t
A 
B 
LV
UAV
Platform Q1 Q2 Q3 QMISS 
LV 0 0 0.150 0.150 
UAV - 0 0.075 0.075 
Mission 0 0 0.210 0.210 
Table 4 – Updated Phase and Mission Failure Probabilities 
failure probability has risen to 21%. This is deemed 
unacceptably high. Thus, at this point a mission 
reconfiguration would take place. Options could be to take a 
different route to point B or perhaps abandon the mission and 
return to the starting points. 
6 DISCUSSION 
Clearly, throughout the course of any mission such as 
those described above for single platforms and multiple 
platforms, the speed at which decisions can be made about the 
future course of the mission is very important. Any way that 
the time taken to make decisions can be reduced will be 
beneficial. The calculations supporting the decision also need 
to be accurate. 
It is proposed that BDDs should be used to manipulate 
and quantify the logical expressions required to calculate 
failure probabilities for the decision making strategy. 
However, due to the requirement to gain prognoses in as close 
to real-time as possible, it would be advantageous to store 
BDDs in an offline library ready for combination and 
quantification as necessary when the mission is in progress. In 
this way the construction of the main BDDs would be carried 
out before any mission is underway. Since BDD construction 
can be one of the more time-consuming parts of the process 
this saves on computation time during a mission. When a 
mission is underway an online combination of the previously 
constructed BDDs would provide the fastest possible results. 
Future research will look at applying the techniques outlined 
in this paper in the most efficient way possible. 
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